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Abstract: 
The dominant model of energy infrastructure has historically been conceived in a very 
centralized fashion, i.e. with hardly any citizen involvement in energy generation. Yet, 
increasing attention is being paid to the transition process towards a more decentralized 
configuration. This article examines the factors likely to foster citizen and community 
participation as regards wind power cooperatives in Denmark, Germany, Belgium and the 
UK. Using Elinor Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System Framework, the analysis highlights a 
double-edged phenomenon: prevailing and growing hostility towards cooperatives, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, strategic reactions to this evolution. What comes out indeed is that, 
throughout most of these countries, the emergence of some coordinated inter-organizational 
actions among cooperatives enables them to survive in their critical environment.  
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1 Introduction 
The dominant model of energy infrastructure has historically been conceived as very 
centralized, with hardly any citizen involvement in energy production. Yet, an increasing 
number of scholars, citizens and policy-makers advocate the transition towards a more 
decentralized configuration, involving geographically dispersed and small-scale generation 
units located close to consumers [1]. Decentralized systems are said to present several 
advantages over centralized ones, including reduced costs for transmission and distribution 
systems, reduced grid power losses, more efficient data management systems and a larger 
share of zero-carbon technologies [2]. In turn, this configuration requires an active role from 
energy users, the latter becoming themselves “prosumers” or co-providers of energy services 
[3].  
In this context, it is thus meaningful to study the factors likely to foster citizen participation. 
Community energy projects, i.e. formal or informal citizen-led initiatives which propose 
collaborative solutions on a local basis to facilitate the development of sustainable energy 
technologies, may have an important role to play in this respect. These initiatives are 
increasingly perceived as key potential actors in the transition toward low-carbon energy 
systems [4]. While incumbent actors suffer a lack of trust from the public [5], the 
implementation of decentralized renewable energy installations and smart metering 
technologies as well as many energy efficiency measures need to be steered by trustworthy 
individuals and organizations rooted in local communities. Community energy enhances 
social acceptance of technologies at the local level, as evidenced by comparative research for 
the case of wind power [6, see also 7]. Moreover, it is linked to identification processes in 
rural areas and can be interpreted as an expression of more participation in decision-making 
on this vital infrastructure [8]. Against the background of these findings on the possible 
economic, social and political impacts of community energy, we focus on the conditions 
under which a specific form of community energy − wind power cooperatives − emerges. 
Renewable energy (RE) cooperatives in general enable citizens to collectively own and 
manage RE projects at the local level [9, 10]. From an economic standpoint, cooperatives 
present a different model of ownership than conventional business organizations. Unlike 
capitalist corporations, they are owned by their members/users rather than investors. In 
addition, net earnings are usually divided pro rata among the members – not according to their 
shareholding – but according to the volume of transactions they have conducted with the firm. 
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In addition, when part of the net income is allocated as a return on capital shares, such profit 
distribution is subject to a cap, which means maximization of return on capital may not be a 
key objective. Finally, they present a democratic governance structure, which involves equal 
individual voting rights and the absence of barriers to entry for new members. 
However, the weight of the RE cooperative sector varies enormously across Europe. While 
the RE cooperative model is well-established in some countries, it remains marginal in others. 
In this article, we conduct a comparative analysis of the contextual factors that affect its 
development in four countries, focusing on the case of onshore wind power: Denmark, 
Germany, Belgium and the UK. The analysis highlights how different factors combine to 
facilitate or, conversely, hinder, the development of RE cooperatives. We emphasize the 
common patterns that emerge from this trans-national comparison without neglecting national 
specificities. One important pattern observed in these countries can be described as a double 
movement. The first side of the movement is a convergent observation of an increasingly 
more hostile environment for cooperatives, a fact which puts them at a relative disadvantage 
compared to conventional actors. The second side of the movement is a process of strategic 
reaction from the part of cooperatives, which consists in the emergence of inter-organizational 
coordinated actions among RE cooperatives in Denmark, Germany and Belgium, such as the 
creation of joint electricity supply or trading companies. These joint initiatives are the result 
of strategic responses of small players to regulatory changes and enable them to survive in 
increasingly hostile environments.  
2 Analytical framework 
Large differences in the development of RE cooperatives have been observed among 
European countries. Various factors have been explored to explain such disparity. Formal 
institutional rules, such as support mechanisms for renewables and spatial planning, along 
with societal norms including attitudes towards the cooperative model and cultures of local 
energy activism, have been identified as major influences on the occurrence of locally owned 
community energy [11, 12, 13, 9, 14, 7]. Other explanations include (bio-) physical 
conditions, and the actors’ ability to act strategically to changes in their environment. Finally, 
it has recently been argued that it is meaningful to investigate how these factors interact in a 
systemic fashion rather than studying them in isolation [1, 15, 16]. The so-called “Social-
Ecological System” Framework may be helpful in this task.  
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2.1 The energy system as a social-ecological system 
In a recent article, Hodbod and Adger [15] argue for framing energy systems as social-
ecological systems. In this perspective, we build the conceptual framework of this paper using 
insights from the Social-Ecological System (SES) Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom 
and her collaborators [17]. The SES framework has traditionally been used to study the 
interactions between the biological basis of ecosystems and social processes. However, recent 
expansions of the framework make it applicable to questions of the governance of humanly 
designed technological systems, such as energy infrastructures [18]. The center of this 
framework is constituted by an “action situation”, in which multiple actors interact with each 
other under the influence of different contextual variables. These interactions produce 
outcomes, which are linked to contextual variables through feedback paths (see fig. 1). 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the social-ecological framework. 
 
Source: McGinnis and Ostrom [18]. 
Contextual variables include Resource Systems, Resource Units, Governance Systems and 
Actors. Resource systems designate the biophysical/technical systems from which Resource 
Units are extracted. These Resource Units can then be consumed, used as inputs in a 
production process or exchanged for other goods and services. Governance Systems include 
“the prevailing sets of processes or institutions through which the rules shaping the behavior 
of the [actors] are set and revised” [19: 181]. Actors are individuals or collective entities who 
participate in relevant action situations and are defined by some shared attribute(s), such as 
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leadership, social capital, access to technologies, management skills, etc. Social, Economic, 
and Political Settings and Related Ecosystems respectively represent the broader social and 
ecological contexts that may influence the focal SES exogenously.  
Hence, the SES framework has the advantage of embracing and integrating into one logical 
entity different approaches: approaches based on agency, which focus on the thoughts and 
actions taken by actors expressing their individual power in social contexts, and approaches 
oriented toward structure, which focus on the set of broader social forces and institutions 
which constrain the choices made by actors. Finally, the framework also sets the 
biophysical/technical boundaries in which social interactions take place. 
2.2 Application of the SES framework to the case of energy systems and RE 
cooperatives 
The factors influencing the development of RE cooperatives involve action situations and 
actors at multiple levels. For instance, most support instruments for renewables are designed 
at the national level, while, in the case of wind power, planning regulations are usually 
located at the regional or local level. The case here is thus characterized by a multi-level or 
polycentric system [1]. Yet for the purpose of this article, we consider countries as the main 
geographical area of analysis. The outcome that is relevant for our inquiry is the pattern of 
occurrence and success of RE cooperatives operating on national power markets.  
Regarding Resource Systems and Resource Units, energy systems can be subdivided into two 
major types of resource systems: biophysical resource systems and technical resource 
systems. Biophysical resource system variables encompass the type and abundance of primary 
energy resources, their location, etc. Technological resource system characteristics cover the 
type and size of technology, the distance from the grid, the intermittency, the storage capacity, 
and many other factors. 
In this article, we are primarily interested in the structural factors, i.e. Governance Systems 
variables which influence the patterns of appearance and success of RE cooperatives. We 
consider Resource Systems and Resource Units essential background factors. On the other 
hand, while idiosyncratic features of RE cooperatives may account for differences between 
organizations, they are unlikely to explain why this sector displays different degrees of 
development across the four countries. Yet there are factors under the form of societal norms, 
such as attitudes towards the cooperative model or cultures of local energy activism, which 
also play an essential role. We here consider them as Actors variables since these norms exist 
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only to the extent that they are embedded in actors. We return to some important interactions 
between the elements of the SES Framework in the following discussion. 
2.3 Operationalization of Governance Systems and Actors variables 
The SES Framework attempts to identify the fundamental building blocks which need 
considering when studying SESs and their internal interactions. As such, the framework can 
be applied to all types of SESs. Yet, to conduct our analysis, it is essential to further specify 
the factors that are relevant in our case. We have identified four main factors based on the 
literature and our empirical analysis: two Governance Systems variables (support mechanisms 
for renewables and planning policies) and two Actors variables (attitudes towards the 
cooperative model and cultures of local energy activism).     
2.3.1 Support mechanisms for renewables 
RE cooperatives use RE technologies that are not cost-competitive to conventional 
technologies for power generation under current power market designs. Support mechanisms 
have been developed to cope with this problem, which lies at the intersection of Resource 
Systems and Governance Systems variables. They have stimulated the use of RE technologies 
by leveling the playing field and making RE projects economically feasible. Feed-in tariffs 
(FiT), feed-in premiums (FiP) and quota obligations are the most widely used types of 
mechanism encouraging the generation of electricity by RE sources in Europe. Some authors 
argue that actors like RE cooperatives are most likely to benefit from risk reducing support 
mechanisms, which keep transaction costs for financing and operating RE projects low [20]. 
Indeed, these organizations have limited resources because they rely on their members' equity 
and external project financing, e.g. bank loans. Moreover, as they focus mostly on one or very 
few local projects, they are generally risk averse because of constraints to hedge and distribute 
risks in small portfolios. Whether a support mechanism is market-dependent or market-
independent constitutes an important factor for risk reduction. Market-independent 
mechanisms like FiTs offer fixed remunerations which are independent of volatile electricity 
prices and are often accompanied by purchase obligations. This gives high investment 
security because of predictable cash flows and low transaction costs. Market-dependent 
mechanisms, such as FiPs or quota obligations, are fully or partly based on volatile electricity 
prices, which gives producers the incentive to react to price developments and can increase 
transaction costs for marketing electricity. For small actors like cooperatives, therefore, 
market-independent mechanisms are generally perceived to be more favorable than market-
dependent ones [21]. 
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2.3.2 Planning policies 
Various aspects of planning procedures, which define rules and relevant actors in the 
operational phase, are likely to affect the development of RE cooperatives. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that participatory schemes improve the chances of getting planning consent 
because they can build on local social networks supporting wind power [14]. On the other 
hand, the small scale of cooperatively-owned projects increases the relative planning risk, 
especially if planning requirements are not differentiated depending on the size of the project. 
In addition, RE cooperatives may find it more difficult than large-scale players to afford the 
failure of planning applications due to lack of resources; they may therefore be more reluctant 
to engage in projects in the first place. Legal obligations for developers to open the capital to 
citizen participation may help overcome this obstacle.   
2.3.3 Attitudes towards the cooperative model 
The extent to which a society is familiar with the cooperative model is likely to play a role. In 
countries where the cooperative movement has an old and well-established tradition, people 
know about this legal structure and are aware of its benefits. In countries where the general 
public and other actors are less familiar with this model, this low awareness may potentially 
constitute a “cognitive barrier” [9]. On the other hand, unwelcome experiences with a specific 
type of cooperative model can constitute a “(negative) historical legacy”. Thus, cooperatives 
may have a negative reputation in some areas. RE initiatives for joint investments will most 
probably take other forms in these cases. 
2.3.4 Cultures of local energy activism 
Various authors [13, 22, 7] argue that local ownership is related to traditions of energy 
activism, and particularly to the anti-nuclear movement. Indeed, anti-nuclear activism is often 
accompanied by increased interest in alternative energy. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
origin of wind cooperatives is strongly linked to an anti-nuclear movement, the Dutch 
Organization for Renewable Energy (ODE) [11]. 
3 Methodology 
We have conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with key actors (cooperative managers and 
board members, intermediary actors, policy makers) in each of the four countries, and carried 
out an extensive analysis of different types of documents: regulatory reports, legislation 
regarding RE generation and citizen participation and documents from relevant actors, e.g.  
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meeting minutes, annual reports of cooperatives, etc. An overview of the conducted 
interviews is summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Interviews conducted. 
Number Position/ Organization Country Date 
1 Cooperative Manager Denmark 23.06.2014 
2 Consultant/Cooperative board member  Denmark 10.07.2014 
3 Researcher/ Cooperative member Denmark 27.06.2014 
4 NGO Manager  Denmark 08.07.2014 
5 Association Board Member Denmark 02.07.2014 
6 Association Manager  Denmark 01.07.2014 
7 Local Administration Official Denmark 27.06.2014 
8 Bank Manager  Denmark 09.07.2014 
9 Company Manager Denmark 03.07.2014 
10 Public Electricity Company Manager  Denmark 03.07.2014 
11 NGO Director Denmark 14.05.2014 
12 Association Director Denmark 01.08.2014 
13 Local administration Germany 10.05.2012 
14 Local administration Germany 28.08.2012 
15 Local administration Germany 05.11.2012 
16 Local administration Germany 24.08.2012 
17 Municipal association officer Germany 11.09.2014 
18 CEO municipal utility Germany 25.06.2012 
19 CEO municipal utility Germany 03.03.2014 
20 Regional wind energy agency officer Germany 20.11.2012 
21 Cooperative association officer Germany 06.11.2012 
22 CEO wind cooperative Germany 22.11.2012 
23 Biogas plant owner Germany 29.01.2015 
24 CEO windpark SPVs Germany 20.09.2012 
25 CEO cooperative association Germany 04.09.2013 
26 Cooperative Board Member  Belgium 04.10.2013 
27 Cooperative Manager Belgium 04.10.2013 
28 Cooperative Manager Belgium 06.03.2014 
29 Coordinator of an Association of Cooperatives Belgium 26.09.2014 
30 Wind Energy Facilitator for the Walloon Region Belgium 14.10.2014 
31 Cooperative Board Chair Belgium 15.10.2014 
32 Wind Energy Facilitator for the Flemish Region Belgium 17.11.2014 
33 Cooperative Employee Belgium 19.11.2014 
34 Cooperative Employee Belgium 19.11.2014 
35 Cooperative Board Member Belgium 20.11.2014 
36 Independent Researcher on Community Energy The UK 30.05.2014 
37 Cooperative Energy Activist The UK 06.06.2014 
38 Cooperative Board Member The UK 13.06.2014 
39 Cooperative Energy Activist  The UK  09.09.2014 
40 Policy Maker, Head of Community Energy 
Department 
The UK 22.10.2014 
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3.1 Case selection 
Several reasons account for our selection of four countries: Denmark, Germany, Belgium and 
the UK. On the one hand, they correspond to different development stages of the cooperative 
energy sector (see fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Approximate number of renewable energy cooperatives in seventeen European 
countries, 2014. 
 
Source: REScoop.eu. 
 
While in Denmark and in Germany, RE cooperatives are already well established, in Belgium 
and the UK they exhibit a much lower degree of development albeit promising growth 
perspectives. These four countries have different main support mechanisms for RE 
development: Germany and Denmark have implemented a feed-in tariff whereas the UK and 
Belgium mainly use a quota obligation system based on the trade of certificates. 
3.2 Data collection 
Although RE cooperatives are but one model of community energy among others, they are the 
focus of the present study. There are methodological and substantive reasons justifying this 
choice. Methodologically speaking, looking at the whole spectrum of community energy 
initiatives would considerably complicate the comparative analysis. In addition, as 
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cooperatives are formally registered organizations and benefit from a legal framework in most 
European countries, they are easier to compare internationally than informal initiatives. 
Furthermore, the cooperative model is arguably one of the strongest forms of community 
energy in Europe. At European level, it is indeed the only model that is represented by a 
federation, REScoop.eu. RE cooperatives are also strongly embedded in the international 
cooperative movement, an international network of cooperatives and advocacy organizations 
that aim at promoting and spreading the cooperative principles of solidarity and democratic 
governance [23]. Furthermore, while the access to finance during the at-risk stage is 
acknowledged as a barrier to the development of community energy projects [24], 
cooperatives are a particularly suitable model to ensure the financial viability of small-scale 
projects through fundraising among community individuals compared to other models 
depending on grants or loan schemes.  
Finally, we concentrate on one technology, onshore wind power, because it is the technology 
that is most commonly developed by cooperatives across the four countries studied. Wind 
power is also characterized by high technical potential and has a major role to play to reach 
European renewable targets. In addition, focusing on one technology greatly facilitates the 
comparison between countries. 
4 Findings about the four countries concerned 
4.1 Denmark 
4.1.1 Background 
Denmark is a pioneer in wind power, the development of which is closely connected to 
cooperatives. These are formally organized as general partnerships where individual citizens 
invest jointly in the procurement of wind turbines to operate them and sell the electricity 
output. In 2002, cooperatives owned slightly less than 40 percent of the total number of 6,300 
turbines installed, and over 150,000 households owned shares in wind power cooperatives. 
The remaining turbines were owned by single owners (approx. 40 percent) – mostly farmers –
and utilities (approx. 20 percent) [25]. By 2004 the number of households owning shares in 
cooperatives had decreased to 100,000 and by 2009 to 50,000 [26]. The number of new wind 
turbine cooperatives after 2009 is difficult to quantify but new wind power projects mostly 
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tended to be developed and owned by utilities and professional project developers.
2
 The 
Danish Wind Turbine Owners association (DK VIND) estimates that by 2010 15 percent of 
all turbines in Denmark were owned by cooperatives [27]. An expert estimates that in 2014 
there were still 300-400 wind power cooperatives with local people holding a majority of 
shares (interview 2). 
4.1.2 Support mechanisms 
Historically, the main support mechanisms available were investment grants for wind turbines 
from the Danish state in the 70s and 80s, tax exemptions for income from wind turbines and, 
from the mid-1980s, fixed feed-in tariffs including guaranteed grid connection, purchase 
obligations and priority transmission for wind power producers [12, 28]. Tax exemptions and 
FiTs created a high investment security for wind projects by guaranteeing stable incomes and 
financing from banks was available at reasonable interest rates (interview 3).   
After a reform of the electricity sector in 1999, Denmark enacted new rules for wind power 
support. Wind turbines authorised between 2000 and 2002 as well as those already in 
operation received a 25 percent lower FiT and payment duration was limited. This reduced 
economic feasibility for new wind projects and the occurrence of new cooperatives was 
slowed considerably. The support mechanism was drastically changed in 2003. After the 
election of a new liberal-conservative government, Denmark implemented a fixed FiP scheme 
in 2003. Producers received the Nord Pool market price
3
 and a fixed maximum premium. 
Moreover, all new producers had to market their electricity directly on the wholesale market. 
Consequently, between 2003 and 2008, there came no new cooperatives while many existing 
ones dissolved. The main reason was that the premium was too low to compensate for low 
Nord Pool wholesale prices, and price volatility was perceived as a big risk by ordinary 
citizens and thus “scared people to enter into the cooperative game” (interview 1). 
Meanwhile, the government had set up attractive incentives for decommissioning and 
repowering old turbines, which were often owned by cooperatives. After receiving good 
offers, many cooperatives dissolved and sold off their turbines to commercial actors. “[…] 
there was a tendency that the bigger developers were the only ones who could deal with these 
problems” (interview 7).  
                                                          
2
 Ownership in wind turbines was centrally registered in Denmark until 2001. There has not been official 
government data on ownership groups ever since and the figures presented here are based on the available 
literature and expert interviews.  
3
Nord Pool is a common electricity spot market between Scandinavian and Baltic countries. Denmark joined the 
exchange in 2000. 
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In 2009, the support mechanism was reformed again when the Danish government enacted the 
Promotion of Renewably Energy Sources Act of 2009 (REA 2009). The fixed premium 
payment was increased, which, as to several interviewed experts, made cooperative wind 
projects economically feasible again. However, with increased turbine sizes, capital 
investments for wind projects have also increased. Due to price volatility under the Danish 
FiP, financing cooperative wind power projects has remained challenging after 2009. 
Cooperatives have thus increasingly sought alternative funding resources [29]. One of these 
was the creation of a trading company called Vindenergi Danmark, which purchases and 
trades electricity at Nord Pool on behalf of wind power cooperatives and other private 
producers. Vindenergi Danmark is organized as a non-profit cooperative owned exclusively 
by its members. Even though there are no exact figures, it is estimated that two thirds of all 
cooperatives trade with Vindenergi Danmark (interview 9).  
4.1.3 Planning policies 
Denmark is the only of the four countries considered here to have from the outset promoted 
the ownership of wind power by local citizens, companies and cooperatives through planning 
schemes and specific regulations.. Around 2000, in fact, cooperatives, single owners and 
farmers owned 80 percent of all wind turbines in Denmark because the government restricted 
ownership of wind turbines to local actors living or being registered in geographical proximity 
to the turbine they owned [12]. Restrictions were completely deregulated after 1999, which 
opened ownership to commercial actors such as foreign companies, and initiated the 
commercialization of wind power in Denmark.  
Spatial planning was also reformed in 1999 in reaction to the growing impacts from larger 
turbines and the decreased availability of designated sites for wind power. Costs for planning 
increased after the reform because procedures became more restrictive and lengthy due to 
higher requirements. This factor and the arrival of more professional actors became 
considerable obstacles for new cooperatives because commercial actors were able to pay 
higher prices and act faster than cooperatives with democratic decision-making (interview 
12). Consequently, local ownership had suffered a drawback since the early 2000s and “it 
became clear that it is quite a challenge to obtain local acceptance if wind power development 
is only driven by professional developers or by large energy companies” (interview 4). 
In 2007, the Danish government started to observe stagnation in wind power and increasing 
local resistance against wind projects as problematic. To restore and maintain public 
acceptance, the Danish government enacted specific regulatory measures to proactively 
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ensure citizen ownership in wind power projects. Under the REA 2009, a local citizens’ 
option to purchase wind turbine shares was implemented, thereby compelling developers of a 
new wind turbine to offer at least 20 percent of the ownership to local citizens living within a 
radius of 4.5 km from the turbine. On the other hand, a public guarantee fund was established 
to support the financing of preliminary investigations, planning, etc. by local wind power 
cooperatives.   
4.1.4 Attitudes towards the cooperative model 
Historically, Denmark has a long tradition of cooperative enterprises. The first cooperatives 
were established in the agricultural sector and became one of the widest spread forms of 
commercial activities in the country during the first half of the 19
th
 century. To this day, 
cooperatives have been a common feature in Danish life, and can be found in many sectors, 
e.g. food industry and retail, but also in public services such as consumer owned energy 
utilities. Even though many cooperative enterprises in rural areas suffered a drawback in the 
1970s, principles of solving problems collectively at the local level and establishing vehicles 
for cooperation, such as e.g. cooperatives, have remained widespread in Danish society. So, 
when wind power technology became commercially available in the 1970s this fell on a fertile 
cultural soil for the cooperative model.  
4.1.5 Local energy activism 
Denmark is characterized by a strong tradition of local energy activism. Anti-nuclear protests 
and grassroots activism experimenting with alternative ways of producing energy go hand in 
hand. On the one hand, these voices can be traced back to the strong and well-organized 
Danish anti-nuclear movement, which was able to influence policy towards support for RE 
[29]. On the other hand, grassroots actors – individuals, farmers or local citizens organized in 
cooperatives – actively engaged in developing alternatives: they set up wind turbines on their 
properties, fought for grid connection and support from government, shared experiences and 
cooperating with a nascent manufacturing and servicing industry for wind power (interview 
12).  
Another important driver for local energy activism and cooperative initiatives is local added 
value through wind projects. Historically, wind power development in Denmark was based on 
the principle that those having to bear the impacts of wind turbines should also enjoy their 
benefits. This principle was challenged after 2000 by the commercialization of wind power, 
when actors external to local communities started implementing wind projects. This trend 
triggered local resistance against wind projects when local citizens felt excluded from 
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decision-making and economic benefits (interview 11). Today, there are more than 200 local 
groups opposing wind power [30]. 
4.2 Germany 
4.2.1 Background 
Germany, like Denmark, is a leading country in RE deployment within Europe. Onshore wind 
power has been the dominating RE technology with around 50 percent of all RE sources. 
Community ownership is estimated to have a share of around 20 percent in this segment of 
the market [31]. In the initial phases of the wind energy sector, this share has even been much 
higher.
4
 The decrease in the share of community energy may be explained by the trend toward 
professionalization and commercialization in this sub-sector of the energy market [32]. The 
most common legal form for community wind is the limited partnership with limited liability 
company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG, henceforth: limited partnership model). The 
main difference with the cooperative model is that usually voting rights are allocated 
according to the amount of capital invested in the limited partnership model, i.e. the 
cooperative democracy principle does not apply. Although cooperatives have experienced a 
rapid growth in recent years–there are around 973 energy cooperatives, among which 82 are 
active in wind [33] – they are mostly active in solar generation, as the latter yield 
comparatively higher returns.  
4.2.2 Support mechanisms 
The German support system has played an essential role in the development of the German 
RE market and contributed to its highly diversified actor structure in power generation [12, 
32, 7]. Both RE development and small actors have been favored by stable instruments since 
1991. Another essential step was the enactment of the Renewable Sources Act (German: 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) in 2000, which granted RE power plants fixed tariffs 
combined with priority feed-in. This considerably reduced market risks and guaranteed 
investment security. Loans at preferential conditions and associated refinancing possibilities 
by Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, now Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), constituted an 
additional favorable factor and helped develop a stable and broad base within the banking 
sector, especially also through local banks in coalitions with other local actors. 
Since 2012, RE plant owners have had the possibility to directly market their electricity and 
receive the difference between fixed tariff and average exchange price – the so-called “market 
                                                          
4
 Bolinger [12] cites a figure of three quarters. 
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premium” – from grid operators. This FiP system has been compulsory since the 2014 
amendment of the EEG. Due to transaction costs and economies of scale with a resulting 
minimum size of the portfolio needed, it is difficult for small actors to enter the electricity 
sales market, which is dominated by few actors with large market shares [34].  
4.2.3 Planning policies 
We highlight two aspects of the planning procedures. First, Germany has planning procedures 
somehow making wind energy projects calculable despite prevailing risks linked to 
environmental assessments and to the pressure of anti-wind groups. Second, there is 
widespread support for the idea of community ownership at the local level despite the 
incapacity of municipalities to legally enforce it. 
The planning phase in Germany usually takes three to five years for wind energy projects. For 
this phase, risk capital is needed which is usually available in energy cooperatives only at a 
very limited scale. Yet, there have been several solutions developed in praxis involving either 
supporting structures such as joint ventures of smaller actors like energy cooperatives or the 
involvement of third parties like developers or utilities [35]. Priority and suitability areas for 
wind power plants are designated by local authorities and differ in restrictiveness between 
regions or even within a region (interviews 14-17). Similar differences can be observed with 
regard to the increasingly well organized “anti-wind” movement which interacts with local 
authorities (interview 18), but seems to be less strong in some areas with high penetration of 
community wind (interview 21). In general, the problem of cooperative wind energy projects 
seems to be not so much with planning procedures, but rather with securing the acquisition of 
land tenure [35] and–at least until recently–with investor protection legislation [36]. “THE 
problem is to acquire the properties at the beginning, and the land owners are so greedy and 
the external developers […] offer such high rents […] But they offer 8-12 percent at the 
beginning, so that a community initiative does not get hold of the properties” (interview 21). 
Local regulatory and planning authorities in some regions also try to actively promote 
community ownership (interviews 13, 14) because of the supposed positive effects on 
acceptance, even if this is contested or relativized by some interviewees (interviews 18, 19).  
4.2.4 Attitudes towards the cooperative model 
Modern cooperatives have a long tradition in Germany. In some areas, however, there have 
been negative experiences with rural cooperatives, due to prevailing skepticism about the 
cooperative model. Cooperatives have been regarded as “old-fashioned” and knowledge of 
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the legal form declined, at least until the marketing campaigns led by cooperative associations 
in connection with the 2006 amendment of the Cooperative Societies Act [38]. 
The rise of the new energy cooperative model coincides with the financial crisis and a search 
for new economic models. In this context, the cooperative model as a democratic legal form 
has been considered to be the ideal legal base for this movement. The higher share of wind 
cooperatives in southern Germany compared with the northern part may at least partly be 
explained by the coincidental financial crisis and development of wind energy in Southern 
Germany – despite prevailing tax advantages for the KG model (interview 21).  
Two regions known for a traditionally strong cooperative movement, namely Weser-Ems and 
Baden-Württemberg, stand out among clusters of developing energy cooperatives. A similarly 
conducive institutional environment seems to exist in Frankonia (the northern part of the 
federal state of Bavaria). Energy cooperatives are less developed in the Eastern part of 
Germany, owing to the socialist era's possibly negative legacy as well as to a financially 
worse-off population (interview 21). 
4.2.5 Local energy activism 
From the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Germany has been a strong anti-
nuclear movement as part of the broader environmental movement which supported the 
development and deployment of RE technologies [39]. This activism within advocacy 
coalitions seems to play a role in many bottom-up initiatives including such energy 
cooperatives. Yet, such legal forms differ despite the essential closeness of the movement to 
the cooperative idea, as the distribution of the limited partnership model in Northern Germany 
shows [39]. Nor can the strength of the anti-nuclear movement explain the differing 
distribution of energy cooperatives across Germany. These are not necessarily located in the 
centers of the anti-nuclear movement. The environmental movement in East Germany, which 
today has fewer energy cooperatives, also articulated critique against nuclear power at about 
the same time as in West Germany [40].  
Moreover, it seems that there is a mixture of motivations behind joint investments in wind 
power. Profitability expectations have been playing a higher role in Germany than elsewhere 
[12, 32]. Advocacy coalitions in wind power have reached beyond the anti-nuclear movement 
and included interested engineers, farmers and other small firms. Along with a process of 
professionalization, stronger competition over sites, and higher rent expectations by 
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landowners, this stronger profit-orientation may also hinder the development of cooperatives 
in some areas (interview 21).  
4.3 Belgium 
4.3.1 Background 
Electricity generation in Belgium is still clearly dominated by Electrabel, the incumbent 
company and former state monopoly. A similar situation prevails on the electricity supply 
market. In Wallonia, there are 19 RE cooperatives ( 9 of which are already active)  and 6 local 
citizen associations, i.e. organizations supposed to be upgraded to cooperatives in the future. 
In Flanders, there are 5 RE cooperatives and 3 local citizen associations. This, for the country 
as a whole, gives a total of 23 RE cooperatives and 11 local citizen organizations. They are all 
active in wind, although some develop other technologies as well. Walloon cooperatives 
represent 4.6 percent of wind power installed capacity [6], while the two largest Flemish 
cooperatives represent about 4 percent of total wind power installed capacity in Flanders. 
Most initiatives are volunteer-based. These figures suggest that the cooperative energy sector 
is still marginal. The case of Belgium is interesting, though, because these cooperatives count 
pioneers, such as Ecopower which is one of the largest cooperatives in Europe in terms of 
membership.  
4.3.2 Support mechanisms 
Electricity from RE sources is given priority in both connection to and use of the grid. In 
addition, it is promoted mainly through a quota system based on the trade of certificates. In 
general, RE is a regional matter; only offshore wind power and hydro power are governed by 
national regulations. Therefore different frameworks exist in the country to support the 
development of RE sources, but the general mechanism of green certificates is common to all 
regions. According to the Social Economic Council of Flanders, the green certificate system 
favors incumbent, large scale energy producers to the detriment of new and more 
participatory initiatives [41]. Existing, large electricity producers and suppliers have an 
advantage over new players because they can easily develop cheap RE production by burning 
biomass in existing coal plants. Getting a permit for a new biomass power plant or wind 
turbines is far more difficult. This tendency of green certificates to favor incumbent actors 
was highlighted by different practitioners: “Green certificates have been implemented to 
encourage green energy projects. But again, these big consulting firms quickly analyzed the 
situation, and Electrabel converted the Awires [coal] plant to burn pellets… […] Green 
certificates had been invented to oblige big companies to change their ground, but they 
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continue exactly the same way” (interview 26). In recent years, the green certificate systems 
have undergone deep changes, both in Flanders and in Wallonia, which resulted in a steep 
decrease in the value of certificates. These changes have had important consequences for RE 
producers, including cooperatives, whose income declined steadily (interviews 26-28, 33, 34). 
To be able to compete on the supply market, 6 wind cooperatives in Wallonia in 2013 jointly 
created a supply company, named Cociter. This is constituted as a cooperative and purchases 
the wind power generated by its members. By doing so, cooperatives benefit from economies 
of scale and reduce transaction costs because obtaining a supplier license requires to fulfill 
various economic and technical conditions. 
4.3.3 Planning policies 
The Belgian institutional context is not particularly conducive to cooperative initiatives. In 
Flanders, for instance, Pepermans and Loots [42] note that wind power has been developed 
following a top-down fashion, while bottom-up emergence is an exception. One problem 
emphasized by several interviewees is the “first-come, first-served” system prevailing in wind 
siting processes in both regions. This means that authorities address the permit requests in 
chronological order. This policy, combined with the scarcity of suitable sites, the increasing 
number of wind developers and the zoning policies of the competent authorities, have created 
a highly competitive environment and encouraged a “wind rush” on the available locations. In 
this context, cooperatives lack the time and resources to act as fast as large-scale wind power 
producers [42]. Since 2011, less new wind projects have been realized, especially in Wallonia, 
due to the increasing number of juridical appeals against wind power projects. To counter this 
trend, new regulation adopted in 2013 by the Walloon government makes it compulsory for 
wind farm developers to open the capital of any new project up to 24.99 percent for citizen 
participation and to 24.99 percent for municipalities’ participation [6].  
4.3.4 Attitudes towards the cooperative model 
With origins going back to the mid-19
th
 century, the cooperative tradition in Belgium is by no 
means new. However, contrary to what occurred in most other European countries, the 
essential cooperative principles were forgotten during the creation of the legal identity of 
cooperatives or, more specifically, “compliance with them was simply considered optional” 
[43:5]. As a result, two kinds of cooperatives have since co-existed: the ones implementing 
the cooperative principle; the others not sharing the cooperative ideal but adopting the 
cooperative status for its convenience. A similar division can be traced concerning RE 
cooperatives, because different investor-owned power companies, including the Belgian 
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incumbent company, created their own cooperative firms to increase citizen participation in 
wind power projects. However, a detailed examination of the statutes of these “top-down” 
initiatives clearly shows that the business purpose of these cooperatives is the acquisition of a 
cooperative capital to finance RE production plants by granting loans to the companies 
actually owning and operating the assets. Hence, cooperative members do not actually co-own 
wind turbines, which remain the property of these operating companies– generally the parent 
power companies or one of their subsidiaries. The emergence of these organizations is a 
challenge for “bottom-up” cooperatives and forces them to emphasize their specificities to 
acquire legitimacy. In this perspective, “bottom-up” RE cooperatives gathered into a national 
federation, REScoop Belgium in 2013, which was split into two regional sections the year 
after. Belgian cooperatives and, notably, Ecopower, have been instrumental in the creation of 
the Federation at the European level, REScoop.eu. 
4.3.5  Local energy activism 
Anti-nuclear mobilization in Belgium has remained marginal and failed to convince the public 
[44]. Still, several cooperative administrators interviewed confirmed that their activity had, at 
its origin, a link with local protest movements against nuclear waste or nuclear energy. “ […] 
there was a project of nuclear waste repository, people mobilized to reject it and contacted 
local associations of environmental protection to help them organize conferences to oppose 
the project [...] we organized a conference about the possibilities of going without nuclear 
energy […] and one of the solutions that were suggested in the area was wind turbines” 
(interview 26). Hence, some cooperative initiatives seem to be linked to local anti-nuclear 
activities, however small. 
4.4 The UK 
4.4.1 Background 
The UK is one of the best locations for wind power in the world. Despite this favorable 
endowment in natural resources, the cooperative energy sector is underdeveloped as compared to 
Germany or Denmark. In 2011, there were 19 RE cooperatives which wholly owned a generation 
capacity of 19.6MW and had part ownership in a further 1.22GW of capacity through investment 
in larger, commercial schemes. Eight organizations were at launch stage and a further 16 were in 
the process of or planning to undertake feasibility studies [45]. The UK’s energy sector is biased 
toward large scale facilities and corporate ownership. Most energy supply in the UK is 
concentrated into six large companies, known as the “Big Six”: British Gas, EDF, E.On, 
nPower, Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern Energy. Only 0.3 percent of the generated 
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electricity does not originate from these utilities. This probably explains the leading role of 
the UK in offshore wind power generation, since “the nature and scale of offshore wind 
implies that their development is concentrated in the hands of utilities rather than individuals 
or communities” [24:545]. The UK has a much smaller capacity of onshore wind power, the 
ownership of which is also dominated by utilities.   
4.4.2 Support mechanisms 
In the UK, the generation of electricity from renewable sources has originally been 
incentivized through Renewable Obligation (RO), a quota system that compels electricity 
suppliers to prove that a certain proportion of the electricity supplied was generated from 
renewable sources. Various scholars argue that this system and its predecessor, the “Non 
Fossil Fuel Obligation”, are responsible for the lack of diversification in terms of scale and 
ownership structures [12, 13, 24]. A Feed-in tariff scheme was launched in April 2010 and 
targets RE plants with a capacity of up to 5MW. It aims at protecting new scales and 
ownership schemes from the more competitive environment created by the RO, which had led 
to few large actors. In his study on the roles of the FiT in community energy development, 
Nolden [24] however notes that, while the FiT presents positive effects for community-led 
development, such as a lower dependence on grants, this isolated measure is unlikely to 
modify the dominant policy framework centered on large-scale developments. This is 
confirmed by several interviewees. For instance, one expert states: “it still doesn’t really fit 
the system […] there is strong political support for [community energy], from all parties, but 
it’s not changing the rules of the system, which is still very much designed for these big 
players” (interviews 36). 
The UK has developed an ambiguous position toward cooperative energy. On the one hand, it 
has actively sought, in recent years, to promote community-based actions in favor of 
renewable energy, through several policy initiatives, such as the Community and Renewable 
Energy Scheme in Scotland or the Assembly's Community Scale Renewable Energy 
Programme in Wales. In January 2014, the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) launched the Community Energy Strategy, which aims at creating a suitable 
environment for community-led initiatives to grow and support them to produce, reduce, 
manage and purchase energy [46]. Practical measures include a £15m Rural Community 
Energy Fund (RCEF), which was jointly established by the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the DECC to support rural communities in England to 
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develop RE projects. A similar £10m fund, the Urban Community Energy Fund (UCEF), was 
created for urban areas.  
On the other hand, in the summer 2014, Her Majesty’s Treasury announced that two major 
incentives to investors currently available to RE projects − the Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(EIS) and Seed EIS (SEIS) tax relief − would be removed from projects qualifying for the 
Feed-in Tariff, RO and renewable heat incentive (RHI). SEIS allows a taxpayer who has 
invested in an eligible scheme to claim back up to 50 percent of his investment in tax relief. 
This scheme has been used by some community energy schemes to offer considerably higher 
returns overall to investors. A different relief scheme will be available, but not for companies 
registered as cooperatives.    
4.4.3 Planning policies 
There has been consistent evidence that planning procedures in the UK represent a 
considerable burden for onshore wind power development as compared to other countries, 
both in terms of planning delays and high planning application failure rates [14, 47, 48]. In 
addition, the planning requirements in terms of imposed delays and negotiation costs are 
disproportionately demanding for small-scale projects as compared to large-scale 
developments [49]. 
As regards measures favoring shared ownership, according to Pollitt [50: 38], “there has been 
an unwillingness to actively involve communities in co-ownership of onshore wind 
developments, possibly because of the dominance of large power companies in the UK within 
the wind power sector and the high transaction costs of such engagement”. However, 
authorities seem to be willing to change this situation. With the publication of the Community 
Energy Strategy, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change asked the renewables 
industry and the community energy sector to work together to establish a voluntary 
Framework to guide shared ownership of RE. A taskforce was established in 2014 to develop 
such framework and published its final Shared Ownership Framework [51]. So far, however, 
the initiative is still embryonic and dissensions exist between community energy groups and 
the energy industry regarding the percentage that developers should offer (interview 40). 
4.4.4 Attitudes towards the cooperative model 
A key reference point in the first wave of cooperative development is the Rochdale Society of 
Equitable Pioneers, which was founded in 1844 north of Manchester by a group of weavers. 
Bolinger [12: 50], however, notes, that despite this pioneering effort, “the use of cooperatives 
has not permeated UK society to the same degree as other European countries such as 
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Denmark and Sweden”. The UK does not have a specific cooperative law, so almost any legal 
business form can be structured along cooperative principles. So far, though, RE cooperatives 
have mainly been formed as industrial and provident societies (IPS). An IPS is an 
organization that conducts an economic activity either as a “bona fide” cooperative (BFC) or 
a “society for the benefit of the community” (Bencom). IPS are registered under the Co-
operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 and are administered by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). The latter institution seems skeptical about the cooperative model 
in the field of energy. In 2014, the FCA blocked a number of RE cooperative applications on 
the grounds that members would not participate enough in these organizations. Indeed, FCA 
rules require a BFC to show participation which it lists as “buying from or selling to the 
society”, “using the services or amenities provided by it” and “supplying services to carry out 
its business” [52]. Directly supplying electricity from a wind turbine to members would be the 
most natural way for RE cooperatives to establish such a commercial participation. Yet, UK 
regulation is such that RE cooperatives are too small to apply for supplier licenses. According 
to community energy activists (interviews 37, 39), the refusal of the FCA to register RE 
cooperatives as BFC could be harmful to the sector, because this legal form is better suited to 
this model than the Bencom legal form. This is because “BFCs can pay a co-operative 
dividend which some see as central to the success of a community consumer model, whereas 
the treatment of capital and profits in Bencoms is currently a very contentious issue” [53: 3].  
4.4.5 Local energy activism 
Historically, grassroots initiatives based on local energy generation as well as a militant anti-
nuclear movement were virtually non-existent in the UK [22]. Rather, a strong tradition of 
landscape and nature protection activism has inspired opposition to wind projects [13]. This 
lack of local energy activism may offer an additional explanation for the low number of wind 
power installations based on local ownership. 
Table 2 presents a synthetic view of the comparative analysis. 
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Table 2. Synthetic table 
 Germany Denmark The UK Belgium 
Support mechanisms 1991: first law that allowed for 
the feed-in of RES.  
2000:Renewable Sources Act. 
Objective: create more stable 
investment conditions.  
2014: Replacement of the FiT by 
a FiP and obligation to market 
electricity directly.  
Before 1999: low-risk investment 
conditions due to tax exemptions, 
fixed FiTs 
2003: establishment of FiP and 
obligation to market electricity 
directly to wholesale market as 
major obstacles to the creation of 
new cooperatives. 
Since 2009: increase of premiums, 
improved investment conditions 
and emergence of new 
cooperatives 
  
Main support mechanism: quota 
system. 
2010: introduction of a FiT for 
installations <5MW. 
Launch of various programs to 
back up the development of 
community energy. 
2014: reform of the tax relief 
schemes. New tax relief scheme 
not available for cooperatives 
Quota system based on trade of 
certificates: favors incumbent 
players to the detriment of 
small-scale challengers. 
2011-2012: saturation of the 
green certificates market and 
decrease in income for RE 
cooperatives. 
Planning procedures Widespread support for 
community ownership at the local 
level, even if no specific 
instruments to legally enforce it. 
Discussion in some federal states 
to make participation obligatory. 
Ownership restriction of wind 
turbines until 2000 
1999: reform of planning 
conditions and new obstacles for 
cooperatives due to rise in costs 
for planning and increasing 
competition. 
2009: obligation for developers to 
open capital of new projects for 
citizen participation. 
 
Planning requirements 
disproportionately demanding 
for small-scale projects as 
compared to large-scale 
developments. 
Ongoing discussions to 
implement a voluntary 
framework for shared ownership 
of RE. 
Unfavorable planning 
conditions for small-scale and 
participatory projects: “wind 
rush” due to first-come, first-
served system. 
2013: in Wallonia, obligation 
for developers to open capital of 
new projects for citizen and 
municipalities participation.   
Attitudes toward the 
cooperative model 
Long cooperative tradition, but 
negative experiences with rural 
cooperatives in some areas, which 
partly explain the choice of other 
community energy models.  
 
Long historical cooperative 
tradition, including in the 
electricity sector. 
 
Cooperative movement 
comparatively weaker, despite 
pioneering initiatives. 
Skepticism of the FCA with 
respect to the cooperative model 
in the energy sector. 
Long historical cooperative 
tradition, but co-existence of 
“true” and “false” cooperatives 
Creation of “top-down” 
cooperatives by investor-owned 
companies. 
Local energy activism Strong anti-nuclear movement, 
but cannot explain regional 
differences. Higher role played by 
Profitability expectations. 
Strong and successful anti-nuclear 
movement which boosted the 
search for alternatives. Tradition 
of local added value through wind 
projects. 
Weak anti-nuclear movement. 
Strong landscape and nature 
protection activism. 
Weak anti-nuclear movement, 
but some cooperatives rooted in 
local protests against nuclear 
wastes. 
Source: constructed by authors. 
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5 Discussion: a double movement 
The results presented above can be summarized as constituting a double movement.
5
 The two 
sides of this movement are explained hereafter.   
5.1 The first side of the movement: the tendency towards a more hostile 
environment 
As the analysis of support instruments and planning policies shows, the first side of the 
movement is the tendency in the four countries studied towards a more hostile environment 
for cooperative initiatives; these are put at a disadvantage compared to traditional developers. 
In Denmark, tax incentives and low-risk investment conditions created by fixed FiTs, 
combined with ownership restrictions prior to 1999, contributed to large scale cooperative 
ownership of wind power until 2000. Since 2003, price volatility under the FiP design and a 
low premium have been major obstacles for the occurrence of new cooperatives and the 
survival of existing ones. As such, the Danish institutional context has become more similar 
to experiences in Belgium and the UK, where market-dependent systems have been in place 
for many years. The UK seeks to secure the development of community-based initiatives with 
the introduction of a FiT for small installations, but this measure appears to be very isolated in 
a context which still favors large-scale players. Germany is experiencing a policy evolution 
similar to Denmark, but with a delay of five to ten years [54]. The fixed FiT regime was 
abandoned in 2014 in favor of a more market-dependent FiP scheme, resulting in a slightly 
higher exposure to volatile electricity market prices and the responsibility of producers to 
market electricity on wholesale markets. In addition, one German federal state is following 
Denmark´s example to legally enforce the financial participation of citizens in new wind 
power projects [37]. A similar legislation exists in Belgium but the effectiveness of these 
instruments in creating new cooperatives or strengthening acceptance has been questioned [6; 
30]. 
This increasingly hostile environment is also shaped, to some extent, by the evolution of 
technological Resource systems characteristics, such as the size of wind turbines. The 
growing size of wind turbines in the countries studied has had two effects. First, planning 
regulations have become more stringent and posed additional regulatory constraints on 
cooperative initiatives due to higher costs and increased complexity for obtaining permits. 
                                                          
5 The expression is borrowed from Karl Polanyi’s classical book “The Great Transformation”. 
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These changes in planning procedures in Denmark and Belgium have led to the entrance of 
more professional and commercial developers, which have discouraged cooperative 
initiatives. In Germany, this tendency to commercialization of projects is even older and 
stronger, as the limited partnership model has typically been developed in collaboration with 
more professional and commercial developers [54]. Second, larger turbines have required 
higher capital investments. This has also encouraged the arrival of commercial actors because 
the latter have had advantages due to relatively higher liquidity combined with the capacity to 
make fast decisions. The arrival of these actors has created more competition for cooperatives 
to obtain sites for wind power development. 
However, our analysis also reveals that these tendencies are not unalterable facts. According 
to the institutionalist approach adopted in this article, markets are themselves complex 
institutional arrangements. We also refer to Karl Polanyi [55], who takes the view that the 
economic sphere and market exchanges are embedded in their social, political, and cultural 
contexts. Accordingly, conceiving of economic activities regardless of their context is 
ideological. The set of Governance Systems variables–support mechanisms and planning 
policies–adopted by a country at some point in time is therefore the outcome of interactions 
between political and grassroots actors in yet other action situations, located at deeper levels 
of decision-making. This outcome reflects these actors' energy policy priorities, and partly 
also the political equilibrium reached at that moment. The case of Denmark illustrates this 
particularly well. Until 2001, the Danish parliament was governed by a coalition of parties 
favorable to wind power and renewable energy. This situation, combined with the influence 
of strong grassroots movements and wind power advocacy groups, led to the “cooperative-
friendly” policies during the 80s and 90s. In 2001, when a liberal-conservative party came to 
power, it embraced a neo-liberal approach to energy policy and cut all support for RE sources, 
which had to stand on their own in the free market. 
It appears, therefore, that the development of wind energy cooperatives is ultimately related to 
issues of power. Yet the framework proposed by Ostrom and her colleagues seems to 
inadequately acknowledge the role of power and interests in the crafting of institutions. 
Scholars studying these issues have generally focused on the “fitness” of institutions to the 
characteristics of the SES. Yet, “besides fitting the SES they govern, institutions also need to 
be supported by a favourable political, economic and discursive context” [56: 158]. 
Institutions not only result from the interactions of (boundedly) rational individuals steered by 
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monetary or non-monetary incentives; they are also shaped to a large extent by power 
distribution [57].   
5.2 The second side of the movement: strategic reactions of cooperatives 
The analysis revealed that agency, understood here as the characteristics of actors and their 
strategic interactions within action situations, also plays an important role. Besides the 
importance of actors in the design of Governance Systems variables and the roles played by 
social norms and culture highlighted above, this is clearly reflected in coordinated actions 
undertaken by cooperatives in the different countries studied. In Denmark, wind power 
cooperatives and individual owners of wind turbines were able to react strategically to 
changes of support mechanisms by pooling their resources and setting up the trading company 
Vindenergi Danmark to take care of electricity sales to the wholesale market.  In Southern 
Belgium, a similar company, Cociter, was created to purchase and directly supply to final 
consumers the energy produced by cooperatives. The case of Bürgerwerke eG offers a similar 
example in Germany.
6
  
Coordinated actions constitute the second side of the double movement. They reduce 
transaction costs, increase revenues from electricity sales for producers. By pooling their 
resources and benefitting from economies of scale from an increased wind project portfolio, 
cooperatives effectively increase the economic feasibility and investment security for wind 
projects. Hence, such coordinated actions can be regarded as strategic reactions to new 
regulations and increasingly unfavorable environments. However, there is a second 
interpretation of the emergence of coordinated actions, which relates to the issue of power 
relationships mentioned above. Coordinated actions are not simply about pooling resources 
and increasing the probability of the economic survival of cooperatives. They are also a way 
of enhancing their bargaining power in the face of incumbent energy actors. Indeed, the latter 
are smaller in number, have relatively homogeneous interests and are able to coordinate their 
substantial resources to resist any change that threatens their interests. In contrast, 
cooperatives are scattered, generally focus on very local issues and have limited resources and 
power. Thus, coordinated actions may also be seen as an attempt to reach a more balanced 
distribution of political power in energy markets, which is still very biased in favor of large-
scale players. The creation of federations of RE cooperatives at national and European levels 
                                                          
6
 Bürgerwerke eG is a fast growing joint venture of currently 28 community energy companies (27 cooperatives 
and one civil law association) selling electricity from community energy power plants plus hydropower. The 
overall philosophy is to take over all tasks in this area which cannot be executed by a single local community 
energy firm. 
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can typically be interpreted in this way. Finally, it is interesting to note that, just as the cost of 
creating energy cooperatives is higher or lower depending on contextual factors, the 
formation of coordinated actions, as a collective-action problem, also entails costs which are 
affected by institutional and actors variables.  
This finding is important for subsequent analysis of decentralized energy systems. While 
decentralization of governance in energy systems is sometimes conceived as a panacea, the 
emergence of coordinated actions among cooperative initiatives calls for a more polycentric 
approach, according to which “various scales need to be taken into account when designing 
regulatory answers and setting up governance arrangements” [1: 136]. In this perspective, 
although decentralized energy systems obviously exhibit a strong local component, inter-
organizational coordinated actions highlight the importance of the ability of local initiatives to 
transcend their local experience in order to form networks at higher levels and articulate their 
interests to national and European strategies.  
6 Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to explain the differences in the degree of development of the wind 
power cooperative sector in four European countries. We have focused on four explanatory 
factors, namely support instruments for renewables, planning policies, attitudes towards the 
cooperative model and local energy activism. Relying on some elements of the Social-
Ecological System Framework, we have emphasized the systemic interactions between these 
factors and the multi-level features of energy systems. Our results can be summarized in what 
we have called a “double movement”.  In this perspective, our results highlight the existence 
of coordinated actions among cooperatives. We have shown that these coordinated actions 
can be interpreted in two ways, which respectively emphasize the economic and political 
contents of these initiatives. On the one hand, they represent strategic reactions of small 
participatory organizations to adapt to policy evolutions and increasing competition on power 
markets. On the other hand, they also constitute a way of establishing networks in order to 
increase their power in energy markets. In this vision, cooperatives not only adapt to 
externally imposed regulatory changes but also seek to actively shape these changes toward 
conditions more in line with their interests.   
This study suggests various avenues for future research. First, at the theoretical level, energy 
systems should be decomposed into multiple action situations connected sequentially or 
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simultaneously. We have emphasized at various places that the development of renewable 
energy cooperatives is a polycentric process, which involves the interaction of actors at 
different levels of decision-making. The framework developed by E. Ostrom and her 
colleagues is particularly helpful in this endeavor. In addition to taking into account physical, 
socio-cultural and institutional characteristics in the analysis of collective action, Ostrom 
emphasizes the need for citizens’ self-organization and participation in the process of crafting 
resilient, just and democratic institutions. If an elite or a dominant group establishes rules 
without the consent of local communities, they are not likely to serve the common good. This 
strongly resonates with the participative and inclusive features of renewable energy 
cooperatives. Moreover, by putting institutions at the center of her approach, Ostrom insists 
on the necessity of a deep metamorphosis of our core economic institutions. Community-
based initiatives will not be able to achieve much unless their development is accompanied by 
deeper changes in the rules of the game. For these reasons, it is argued here that this 
framework holds great promises for the analysis of the decentralization of the governance in 
energy systems. Another implication would be to assess more accurately the role of power 
relationships, both theoretically, within the SES framework, and empirically, in the 
development of wind energy cooperatives. Third, coordinated actions among cooperatives 
would deserve further analysis of their functions, the way they are created and the actors they 
involve. For instance, they likely differ in the extent to which they play a more economic or 
political function. Some may be more oriented towards economic functions while others 
primarily exert a political role. It would be interesting to study these distinctions and how they 
relate to other factors.        
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